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BOOK REVIEW
The Next Generation of
Legal Scholarship?
Richard A. Epstein*
By Bruce A. Ackerman. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1977. ix
+ 303 pp. $12.95.

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION.

Within the past generation, we have witnessed a marked shift in
the style and tone of legal scholarship, and nowhere is that shift
more evident than in Professor Bruce A. Ackerman's recent study,
Private Property and the Constitution. That the book differs in style
and tone from the great treatises of Corbin and Wigmore is too
obvious for comment, and too unimportant for analysis. That it
should differ in many important ways from such books as the late
Alexander Bickel's The Least DangerousBranch1 makes a more telling
point about current trends in interpretive constitutional and legal
scholarship. While Bickel was intent upon developing an overarching theory about his constitutional subject matter, his detailed analysis of both judicial and academic writings shows a firm link between
traditional legal scholarship and the leading edge of legal thought.
Ackerman, however, is quite a different matter. Even a quick overview of the book makes manifest the extent of his departure from
the standard approaches to legal analysis. He makes no exhaustive
effort to organize his subject matter into smaller doctrinal questions,
each of which then can be resolved on its individual merits. With the
A.B. 1964, Columbia College; B.A. 1966, Oxford University (Juris); LL.B. 1968, Yale
University. Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies in
Behavioral Sciences, 1977-78.
1. Bickel's classic was published in 1962. Ackerman interestingly describes it as an
instance of the "last generation's scholarship." P. 204 n.5. He also includes in that group: A.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); L. HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1958); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1

(1959).
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exception of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 2 he makes no effort to
analyze and criticize the classical judicial responses to the eminent
domain problem.3 And, with the exception of some insightful comments on the important contributions of Professors Michelman and
Sax, 4 he makes little effort to build upon the vast law review literature on the subject. All of these omissions are conscious and deliberate. To Ackerman, they all count as essential strengths of his approach, for it is precisely in the uncritical reliance upon traditional
legal methods that Ackerman locates the great weakness in the
prevailing interpretations of the eminent domain clause, interpretaargument
tions that, in his words, amount to "a chaos of confused
5
how."
knew
only
one
if
right
set
be
to
ought
which
A clean break from the past by Ackerman is thus the first order
of legal business, and to him that break can be made only by
stepping back from the particulars of eminent domain law to obtain
a broader overview of the subject. The first question thus becomes
not what answer does the Constitution provide on any given substantive question, but rather, what mode of interpretation and
analysis should be brought to it in order to improve the chances of
reaching the correct substantive result. In one real sense, then, his
book is as much, if not more, about methods of constitutional interpretation as it is about eminent domain6 law, for Ackerman intends his method to have wide application.
I.

THE FRAMEWORK

Ackerman begins with the applicable constitutional text, which
provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For discussion of Mahon, see text accompanying notes 50-54
infra.
3. Although Ackerman discusses a fair number of cases in the footnotes, they are clearly
collateral to his main purpose, for the central arguments in the text seem nowhere to depend
upon these discussions.
4. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof 'Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, PrivateProperty and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (197 1); Sax, Takings and the Police Powers, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). See,
e.g., pp. 54-56 (critique of Sax).
5. P. 8. Ackerman cites as evidence for this general view within the profession the
frequent conversations he has had with lawyers and judges. Although his position may be
overstated, the frequency with which new articles appear on eminent domain problems
suggests that there are indeed major difficulties in the area.
6. See, e.g., pp. 168-85. This chapter, entitled On the Nature and Object of Legal Language,
contains an utterly arid and abstruse discussion of, I suppose, the deeper philosophical issues,
highlighted by the absurd reference to the "rival Popes temporarily quartered at Oxford,
Chicago, and Yale"--i.e., Ronald Dworkin, Richard Posner and Harry H. Wellington.
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without just compensation." 7 In order to show the need for philosophical speculation about the content of the eminent domain
clause, he first attempts, in a section entitled The Limits of Legal
Convention,8 to show the insuperable weaknesses of the more traditional modes of constitutional interpretation, at least as applied to
eminent domain problems. First on his list is the "plain meaning"
approach, which assumes that a close inspection of the text will
reveal all of its unresolved secrets. Yet, for Ackerman, the search for
the plain meaning in the end must be utterly unproductive because,
whatever its intentions, the search reduces itself to "staring" at the
text in a hollow effort to answer the essential questions that it raises:
"[W]hen does an interest qualify as private property? [U]nder what
conditions should the state be said to have 'taken' the interest?
[When does justice demand compensation and how is the adequacy
of payment to be assessed?" 9
A second method of interpretation, ascertaining the "intent of
the framers," also is of no real help in filling in the gaps left by the
text. True, the eminent domain clause is itself evidence that the
framers recognized some special place for private property in the
Constitution,' 0 but beyond that point there is no strong clue as to
how any of them, individually or collectively, would have resolved
the many complex problems that subsequently have arisen in eminent domain litigation. As these two methods yield but limited fruit,
the traditional legal scholarship has remaining only one place to
turn: the cases decided under the clause. But these, as Ackerman
points out, constitute the tangled web of argument that is the source
of the well-nigh universal dissatisfaction with the current law.
Having thus dismissed the conventional forms of analysis, Ackerman argues that we can confront successfully the issues raised by the
eminent domain clause only by systematically examining the various
philosophical approaches that might be used to resolve them. Here
his stated mission is not to pick and choose among these approaches,
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Pp. 5-10.
9. P. 6.
10. At times Ackerman seems to equate the special place of private property under the
Constitution with the perpetuation of the market economy, thus treating the eminent domain
clause as the mechanism whereby the respective domains of the "capitalist economy" and the
"activist state" are reconciled. See, e.g., pp. 1-2. The eminent domain clause, however, has
nothing to do with any particular type of economic organization, at least where the "public
use" requirement places no independent constraint upon the power of the government to take
private property; constitutionally, we could nationalize the automobile industry if we were
prepared to buy off the stockholders.
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but rather to give some accurate and analytical description of the
different positions to which judges, in principle, should be committed by their basic philosophical orientations. Doing this "philosophical" work in turn requires Ackerman to formulate a complex terminology and an elaborate matrix of distinctions, as he believes the
available language is not sufficiently precise to express the arguments he wishes to make.
Ackerman organizes most of his discussion around two distinctions. The first, between Policymaking and Observing, distinguishes
between alternative approaches to legal problems. The second is a
distinction between Scientific and Ordinary understanding of language. With respect to the first of these distinctions, Ackerman
places on the Policymaking side "all those who understand the legal
system to contain, in addition to rules, a relatively small number of
general principles describing the abstract ideals which the legal
system is understood to further."' I "To qualify one must learn to think
of the legal system as if it were organized around a self-consistent set of
abstractprinciples that comprise the system's Comprehensive View."'12 The
choice of a particular Comprehensive View, whatever its ultimate
significance to Ackerman, is not important at the outset;' 3 the mode
of argumentation, not the substantive principles of argument, is
decisive at this point.
In opposition to the Policymaker stands the Observer, who, far
from being a simple realist, believes that "the test of a sound legal
rule is the extent to which it vindicates the practices and expecta-tions embedded in, and generated by, dominant social institutions."' 4 The difference between the two types is that the Policymaker necessarily must relate all his decisions to this Comprehensive
View; the Observer admits that such a view possibly exists, but acknowledges the unhappy possibility that it does not. 15
Ackerman sets out the second of his central distinctions, that
between Ordinary and Scientific understanding of legal language,
in the following passage:
11. P. 11.
12. P. 90.
13. Early on he warns the reader: "To forestall misunderstanding, I do not want you to
think a Policymaker must impute to the legal system a Comprehensive View of a Highly Moral
variety-like that imagined by Immanuel Kant or Myres McDougal. For present purposes, it
will be enough for the analyst to worship a more mundane-if not more intelligible-God, like
Bentham's Utility or Posner's Efficiency." P. 11.
14. P. 12.
15. Id.

February 1978]

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

According to the first approach, legal language cannot be understood unless its roots in the ordinary talk of non-lawyers are constantly kept in mind. While legal specialists, naturally enough, will
sometimes be called upon to make refinements generally ignored
in ordinary language, recourse to everyday, nonlegal ways of
speaking can be expected to reveal the basic structure and animating concerns of legal analysis-stripped of the excessive technicality generated by special pleading and adversary confrontation. In
contrast, the Scientist conceives the distinctive constituents of legal
discourse to be a set of technical concepts whose meanings are set
in relation to one another by clear definitions without continuing
reliance upon the way similar-sounding concepts are deployed in
nonlegal talk. While the practitioner of Ordinary analysis will find
that nonlegal discourse will provide a useful perspective upon basic
concepts that may otherwise be lost in a sea of legalism, the Scientist
will look upon
such an appeal to ordinary talk as the surest sign of
6
muddle.'

From these two distinctions we can generate four separate approaches. Of these, Ackerman is particularly concerned with the
relationship between the Ordinary Observer and the Scientific
Policymaker, 17 and it is in terms of this dichotomy that he states and
defends the central thesis of his book.
Ackerman's basic position 18 runs roughly as follows: As a matter
of historical fact, the tradition of Ordinary Observing has dominated the interpretation of the eminent domain clause, and it alone
can account for most of the surprising, if contradictory, developments that have persisted in the cases. In spite of its historical
dominance, however, the tradition is at an intellectual dead end
because its internal contradictions and confusions are too obvious
and too troubling for thoughtful modern judges to ignore. Enter
Scientific Policymaking. Within that framework Ackerman identifies two dominant traditions, the Utilitarian1 9 and the Kantian. 20 It
16. Pp. 10-11.
17. The other two combinations are the Scientific Observer and the Ordinary Policymaker. Ackerman does not presume it is impossible for any responsible thinker to assume either of
these two postures, and he expressly notes the importance of those whom he would call
"Scientific Observers" in American legal history. Pp. 18-22. Although Ackerman does not
name the writers he had in mind, his reference to the years 1870 to 1920 suggests Ames,
Langdell, Maitland, Thayer, and even the early Holmes. In any event, he regards these two
classes of thinkers as less important to the modern tradition, and there is a certain plausibility
to his view. Those who believe in ordinary language tend generally, I believe, to be more
cautious about social innovation than those who have faith in "scientific" language and theory.
The point is debatable, of course, but for present purposes it is best to concentrate upon what
Ackerman has written, rather than to speculate about what he might have written.
18. For a convenient summary of the position, see p. 4.
19. Pp. 41-70.
20. Pp. 71-87.
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is to one of these traditions we must turn, he insists, to find salvation
from our current dilemmas. The thesis is written on a grand scale,
and is, I think, subject to important, and perhaps fatal, objections.
We must now consider Ackerman's main program.
II.

SCIENTIFIC POLICYMAKERS

The first substantive move in Ackerman's argument relates to
the distinction between Ordinary and Scientific talk about property. 2 1 In his view, the Ordinary speaker of the language is "ignorant"
because he is prepared to talk in an uncritical fashion about the
ownership of "his" things. No one, at least no one who has had a
first-year property course, accepts this type of speech as accurately
describing legal realities. Indeed, far from "defining the relationship between a person and 'his' things, property law discusses the
relationships that arise between people with respect to things. More
precisely, the law of property considers the way rights to use things
22
may be parcelled out amongst a host of competing resource users."
Armed with this account of property, Ackerman concludes that "it
risks serious confusion to identify any single individual as the owner
of any particular thing."2 3 At best, the label "owner" serves "as a
shorthand for identifying the holder of that bundle of rights which
contains a range of entitlements more numerous or more valuable
than the bundle held by any other person with respect to the thing
in question." 24 Making this point gives the Scientific speaker the
ability to identify a taking of property under the law: Any diminution of rights in the bundle of any holder, no matter what becomes
of those rights, 2 5 amounts to a taking under the law. We now have
found out in Scientific Talk what the property clause means. The
Scientist first identifies the rights in the claimant's bundle before the
intervention of the governmental activity; taking then means the
deprivation of any rights in the bundle. To me, this is common sense;
to Ackerman, science.
Providing an account of a taking of property does not, however,
solve all questions under the eminent domain clause. There is still
the need to specify the possible excuses or justifications-for example, abatement of a public nuisance-that might be advanced for
21. Pp. 26-29.

22. P. 26.
23. Pp. 26-27.
24. P. 27.
25. For the Scientist, it matters not whether they be retained by the state or transferred
to another.
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any admitted public taking. 26 Yet finding a suitable Scientific explanation that reconciles the basic command of the clause with its
possible exceptions depends not only upon the methodological approaches to eminent domain issues, but also upon the particular
substantive philosophical outlook brought to eminent domain questions.
From a large number of possible Comprehensive Views that
might be brought to the eminent domain clause, Ackerman wisely
limits his discussion to the two dominant schools of American legal
thought. He focuses first on the Utilitarian tradition, which defines
as the goal of society the maximization of social welfare, human
pleasure, output, or efficiency. The difficulties in identifying or
measuring the central good of any Utilitarian theory may be severe,
but Ackerman is not concerned either with the internal disputes
amongst Utilitarians or with whatever intellectual difficulties beset
the entire tradition. Rather, his interest is with attitudes of the
conscientious Utilitarian, however misinformed, toward eminent
domain questions-with, in other words, the application of philosophy, not with the doing of it.
To determine how the good Utilitarian approaches cases under
the eminent domain clause, Ackerman uses the example of wetlands
regulations that forbid owners of marshland to fill in and develop
their land. In this and other cases, he identifies two types of costs
associated with government actions: The first cost, "General Uncertainty," is borne by individuals who are or who may become subject
to government regulation and control; the second is the possibility
of "Citizen Disaffection" in the event that compensation is not paid
to those who have been singled out by government action. Ackerman then asserts that the good Utilitarian will compensate those
adversely affected by legislation if the process costs of administering
Costs (U)
compensation (P) are less than the sum of Uncertainty
27
and Costs of Citizen Disaffection (D), or P < U + D.
26. Ackerman recognizes the importance of justifications in eminent domain theory, but
does so only through a highly questionable interpretation of the words, "without just compensation." Thus, he writes that "the clause, when read as a whole, suggests that payment is
constitutionally required only when it will serve the purposes ofjustice." P. 28. Yet the word "just"
in this phrase seems only to refer to the amount of compensation owed once the right to
compensation is established. The separate issue of justification must be inferred from the fact
that the clause sets out only the initial constitutional presumption, while leaving the courts to
determine the limits to be placed upon it. Indeed, the failure to recognize the insistent need
for implied exceptions in most constitutional and statutory materials is one of the major
weaknesses of the "plain meaning" rule.
27. P. 48.
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In opposition to the Utilitarians, Ackerman places the Kantians,
who are thus described not because they bear any necessary allegiance to the principles of Immanuel Kant, but because they share
an anti-Utilitarian bias, borne of the belief that the Utilitarian calculus does not respect the differences between persons when it
sacrifices the rights of one individual for the advancement of some
overall good. Ackerman's good Kantian, then, is one who takes
seriously the principle that persons should be regarded as ends in
28
themselves, and not as means for the advancement of others.
Ackerman then schematizes the Kantian view of the clause, again
in connection with the case in which the owners of undeveloped
marshland are pitted against the others in society. He correctly notes
that the attitude toward compensation is likely to be quite different.
"Indeed, the mere fact that the Earthlings.

.

.have profited enor-

mously by the legislative reassignment of property rights only makes
the Kantian's case for compensation seem more, not less, compelling." 29 From this and other considerations, Ackerman then proposes another formula to capture the Kantian view: Compensation
is to be awarded when the process costs of administering compensation (P) are less than the benefits (B) produced by the reassignment
30
of rights minus the other costs of the project (C), or P < B - C.
A.

The UtilitarianApproach

In Ackerman's wetlands case, the government limitation upon
the development rights in marshes dearly abridges previous property rights and thus constitutes a taking under the Scientific view of
property. Yet it is easy to read Ackerman as putting to one side all
this hard-gained wisdom about property rights in an effort to explicate the judicial stance of the Scientific Policymaker with a Utilitarian Comprehensive View. Thus, Ackerman is able to write:
Eschewing all talk about the intrinsic rights of a property owner,
the courts would self-consciously explore the 'real issue,' understood as the identification of the social group which can bear the
burden entailed by the new legislative decision with the smallest
loss in overall utility. Judicial discussion of the ease of insurance,
the costs31 of disaffection, and the costs of settlement would
abound.
28. P. 72.
29. P. 73. Ackerman calls those people who do not own the marshland "Earthlings," as
opposed, of course, to the Marshans.
30. P. 74.
31. P. 64.
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To my mind, such a utilitarian approach represents a massive
degeneration of property law because it treats eminent domain
adjudication as an extension of politics by other means. The special
place of private property conceded at the outset is reduced under
this regime to the merest chimera, as all talk of rights and duties is
replaced by freewheeling judicial selection of "winners" and "losers." Ackerman thinks that it is possible to be a "restrained" Utilitarian judge. But if the agenda is as he would set it, all judges would be
required to strain beyond the limits of their institutional capacity in
order to decide any of the cases that arise when modern legislation is
attacked under the clause. Courts would have to reduce the tangled
web of issues presented by marshland development restrictions to
the "real issue" of identifying which group is to bear the loss. Is
there one set of rules for the speculator who purchased marshland
and quite another for the family trust that has held the land for
years? And how do we treat the different shades of investment
behavior that fall in between? 32 It seems clear that any marshland
legislation must treat all marshowners the same way, regardless of
the time of acquisition or the reasons for it. Any intermediate
position would create complications beyond all reason as courts
struggled to uphold the legislation with respect to some marshland
owners but not to others. Yet, given the multitude of variables
bearing on the "real issues" of the case, it seems doubtful in the
extreme that any consistent pattern of results could be achieved by
the faithful Utilitarian judge.
There not only would be an abundance of hard cases, but also a
marked absence of easy ones. Any admissible interpretation of the
eminent domain clause should be able to identify simple cases that
admit of no confusion or uncertainty. Thus, there is an easy case for
compensation when a home or factory is torn down to make way for
a post office, and I should be appalled if any adroit manipulation of
process costs, disaffection costs, insurance costs, or any costs whatsoever persuaded even one court in one case to deny compensation.
Likewise, I should be dismayed if even one court in one case awarded
compensation to a firm that for years supplied the government with
32. The range of considerations that Ackerman regards as compelling is quite wide. For
example, at pp. 67-68, Ackerman sets forth all the considerations that a Utilitarian judge
might find relevant in the speculator's case, including that such land usually is acquired by
speculators who are accustomed to taking these risks. The question is not whether they have
taken the risk, but whether they should in principle be required to take it without compensation. A speculator takes the risk of vandalism and arson, but need not be deprived of legal
remedies when such acts occur.
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soldiers' uniforms under annual contracts when, after competitive
bids, the new contract was awarded to a rival. These cases are easy.
The first involves the taking of property and the second, whatever
the economic consequences, does not. Any Utilitarian theory that
obscures these clear results in a fog of verbiage about the "real
issues" of eminent domain deserves not respect but rejection. If
what Ackerman says about the-Utilitarian approach to the eminent
domain clause is correct, so much the worse for Utilitarianism.
It must be stressed that Ackerman is quite conscious of the
Byzantine results yielded by the Utilitarian form of Scientific Policymaking, but to him that complexity is a sign not of its fatal weakness
but of its obvious virtue and sophistication. Thus, he sees
a gradual yet discernible increase in the Scientific Policymaking
character of our legal culture, to the point where express reliance
upon Ordinary concepts sometimes seems of questionable propriety. To any modern lawyer, there is an irreducible crudity about a
decision that justifies compensation on the ground that the plain33
tiff has been deprived of something that formerly was "his."
"Irreducible crudity"?! It is precisely the oversophistication that
Ackerman brings to the eminent domain clause that should make it
difficult for any modern lawyer with a moral sense to be happy with
his casual nullification of its compensation requirement. It is not
that every taking of private property requires compensation, but
rather that any taking, even for public use, creates a strong presumption that compensation should be paid. The clause thus shifts
the burden to the government to show, preferably under some
general theory, why compensation is inappropriate in any particular
case. Ackerman's effort to construct out of whole cloth a Utilitarian
theory of the eminent domain clause while ignoring, if not mocking,
its actual language draws him away from these central issues of
justification for admitted takings. It is not surprising, given his
impatience for traditional analysis, that his treatment of the police
power and the public nuisance justifications for government regula34
tions is both fragmentary and inadequate.
The criticisms just made might be better expressed somewhat
differently. Ackerman's explicit assumption throughout his book is
that the Constitution places no constraint upon the basic political
premises that a judge is entitled to bring to eminent domain cases.
Both Kantian and Utilitarian interpretations of the basic clause seem
33. Pp. 114-15.
34. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
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in his view equally permissible. Yet his very explication of the
Utilitarian position is the most striking confirmation that the eminent domain clause demands its flat rejection. The Utilitarian tradition, whenever brought to bear on legal questions, has found both
the question of rights, and that of compensation for their violation,
to be of marginal concern. 35 For many Utilitarians, the overriding
issue is that of efficient resource allocation; private rights take on
importance solely in an instrumental connection, usually in determining whether public creation or assignment of property rights
will increase social welfare. The text of the eminent domain clause,
on the other hand, gives the compensation issue a centrality that
suggests that no pure Utilitarian theory will ever be successful in
unlocking its secrets.
B.

The Kantian Approach

The tenuous relationship between Ackerman's Utilitarian analysis and the obvious concerns of the eminent domain clause should
drive Ackerman's readers towards the Kantian tradition-which is
marked by a greater concern for the vested rights that animate any
private property system. But by defining the master test of this
tradition as whether process costs are less than the net social benefits
of rights-that is, whether P < B - C-Ackerman seems to miss the
core concerns of most non-Utilitarian thinkers. The point is difficult
to make with satisfactory exactness, because Ackerman lumps together so many individuals who disagree in major ways amongst
themselves. For example, Robert Nozick's "historical theory of justice" makes it clear that some non-Utilitarians are more concerned
with the antecedent conduct of the relevant parties-how they
"come by" their wealth-than with the consequences of proposed
government action.3 6 A strict interpretation of such a theory, howev35. The relative unimportance of "compensation issues" to Utilitarians is brought out by
the modern debates over the nature and function of tort law. Thus, my colleague Professor
Posner, the unstinting champion of efficiency rationales, has dismissed the compensation
question as a mere "detail" of tort theory. In his Economic Analysis of Law, he writes: "It is thus
essential that the defendant be made to pay damages and that they be equal to the plaintiff's
loss. But that the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a detail. It
is payment by the defendant that creates incentives for more efficient resource use." R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAi, § 4.9, at 78 (1st ed. 1972) (footnote omitted). It is interesting to
ask: What is the importance to Posner that compensation in eminent domain cases be paid to
the owner? Authors who have more traditional views on the corrective justice issues in tort
theory regard the compensation question as much more central. See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).

36. R.

NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

(1974). The key chapter for these pur-

poses is Chapter 7, DistributiveJustice, at pp. 149-23 1.
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er, may permit no exercise of the eminent domain power: The
individual whose property is to be taken has done nothing wrong to
oblige him to yield to an exchange dictated by the state, no matter
how fair its terms. Whatever the philosophical merits of this uncompromising position, however, it does not represent the proper interpretation of the eminent domain clause, which clearly permits
takings for public use, but only if compensation is paid. The eminent
domain clause thus appears to be an uneasy mix of Utilitarian and
individualistic concerns. Its Utilitarian premise is that the government may use its discretion to decide whether particular property in
private hands today will be better located in public hands tomorrow.
The individualistic concern says that the state must pay compensation whenever it makes that decision. In the useful language of
Calabresi and Melamed, the eminent domain clause serves in the
public sphere to convert a "property right" into a "liability right,"
37
but not to extinguish all rights whatsoever.
It seems unlikely, however, that any Kantian could think that the
magnitude of public benefits has anything to do with the necessity
for compensation. No matter how great the total benefits, compensation should be paid lest the state profit at the expense of one of its
citizens. No matter how small the total benefits, compensation still
should be paid lest the blunders of public officials be at the expense
of the owners of private property. Thus, if the state decides to build
a schoolhouse on private land, just compensation always should be
measured by what has been taken, and lost, no matter whether the
school is a tribute to civic foresight or a waste of public funds. The
Utilitarian aspects of the eminent domain question figure only in the
political decisions of the state and do not affect the property owner's
right to compensation. The Kantian part of that equation demands
that the right to compensation be independent of what the state
chooses to do with the property once it has been taken for public
use. A formula-P < B - C-that compares the process costs of
condemnation with the net social value from condemnation is then
but another unacceptable variant of a Utilitarian, or at least a consequentialist, calculus. The recurrent reliance upon relative costs and
benefits also demands the same type of open-ended inquiry set into
motion by the analogous Utilitarian formula, and is subject to the
same set of objections. The fundamental difficulty with both formulas is that they do not address in explicit terms the question
37. Calabresi & Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the
Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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raised by the Constitution-has there been a taking of private property for public use? The mass of evidence needed to decide every
asserted claim for compensation deprives us of all sense of what is
and is not an easy case, with the consequent loss in fidelity to both
the language and the spirit of the clause. Although there is much to
be said for trying to understand the eminent domain clause as an
extension of a theory of individual rights that is truly Kantian in
spirit, Ackerman's account does not aid that inquiry.
III. RESTRAINED AND INNOVATIVE JUDGES
The previous summary and criticisms of Ackerman's views proceeded on the assumption that he believed that all Kantian or all
Utilitarian judges would bring the same premises and attitudes to
every eminent domain case. Ackerman's own view of the subject is
far more complex, as he thinks that it is possible not only to have
Kantian and Utilitarian judges, but to have at least eight different
species of each, all with their own subtle variations on the major
8
themes.a
The key to this new element of complexity is the set of distinctions that Ackerman develops with respect to the judicial role. Reflecting the obvious influence of current constitutional theory, Ackerman notes that it is possible for any judge to take either a "restrained" or "innovative" approach to constitutional interpretation,
with restrained judges obviously being less willing than innovative
judges to override legislative or administrative decisions. Ackerman,
in another display of his obvious fondness for typology, then refines
this distinction by making three further subdivisions. Along the first
of his three axes, judges must decide whether they believe that the
distribution of property rights before the moment of government
intervention ("at Time One") was reached in a well-ordered manner
by the legal system. Those who so believe are called conservative;
those who do not are called reformist. Along the second axis, judges
must decide whether they believe that other governmental institutions act consistently with the judges' Comprehensive View of society. Those who believe that these institutions so behave are called
deferential; those who do not are called activist. Lastly, on the third
axis, judges must decide whether they believe that disappointed
litigants generally will accept judicial decisions as legitimate. Those
who are unwilling to take the sentiments of "bad losers" into account
38. Ackerman's development of these eight species is at pp. 31-39.
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are called principled; those who are not are called pragmatic. Out of
the two basic types, therefore, come eight possible variations, from
conservative-deferential-principled, on the one extreme, to reformist-activist-pragmatic on the other.
It is difficult to resist the impression that the constant references
to these distinctions in Private Property and the Constitution only make
it more difficult to follow an analysis that in any event suffers from
all the ills of overformalization. The obvious critical point is that the
possible variations upon the basic theme raised by these eight types
need only be taken into account if we are persuaded of the soundness of the basic Kantian or Utilitarian approaches. If, as I have
argued, Ackerman's Utilitarian account misses the central concerns
of the eminent domain clause, then there is little reason to trace the
tortured logic of each of his learned variations. And if his interpretation of the basic Kantian position is indeed misguided, then there
is no particular joy in reading eight different versions of the same
cardinal error. 39 The proliferation of judicial types therefore has
this dual vice: It impedes the flow of the discussion and it inhibits
Ackerman from his more immediate task of rehabilitating his main
line of analysis.
A second problem with Ackerman's rich store of distinctions is
that, like his general schematic representations, they tend to obscure
the interpretation of the eminent domain clause in a welter of
tangential issues. Consider only Ackerman's case of development
rights over marshland. How does any reformist judge, who believes
that there is maldistribution of wealth in society, use that insight to
pass on the constitutionality of a challenged statute? Should the
judge be concerned with whether a particular claimant is a victim or
a beneficiary of that alleged maldistribution? A widow owns land
that the government wants for the construction of a schoolhouse.
Should it make any difference whatsoever that her late husband
took advantage of a special oil depletion allowance during the last 30
years of his life? Or that he profited from the illegal drug trade?
And if these issues are not relevant to a reformist judge, then exactly
what issues are?
Similar difficulties beset both activist and pragmatist judges.
What must the activist judge do when he decides that the other
organs of government do--or do not-generally act in accordance
with the appropriate Comprehensive View? And how must a prag39. See p. 82 for an example of some particularly heavy and obscure writing.
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matist judge proceed when there are strong interests and expectations on both sides of a given question? Surely it cannot be proper to
take evidence on the extent and the intensity of possible individual
responses to any judicial outcome.
There may be ways that these three distinctions-particularly
that between activist and deferential judges--can be taken into
account on particular issues of eminent domain law. The matter,
however, needs a detailed exploration in connection with concrete
cases, and it can assume significance only after the basic structure of
eminent domain arguments is first worked out. The difficulties that
beset Ackerman's Utilitarian and Kantian judges cannot be cured by
abstract typologies of the judicial role.
IV.

ORDINARY OBSERVING

We turn at last to Ackerman's treatment of the Ordinary Observing approach to eminent domain law, at once the most interesting
and the most troublesome portion of his book. About this species of
legal reasoning Ackerman has two distinct, but related, theses. The
first is that the Ordinary Observer is better able than his Kantian or
Utilitarian brethren to account for the twists and turns in the current eminent domain law.4 0 The second is that the proliferation of
new forms of property rights-be they stocks and bonds, or the
complicated entitlements of the welfare state--create analytical complications that strain the capacities of ordinary methods in ways that
cry out for an adoption of some form of Scientific Policymaking in
41
eminent domain cases.
To make his general point, Ackerman, in some of the best
writing in the book, takes us through a nice set of hypothetical
examples that are designed to illustrate the way in which Ordinary
judges proceed from case to case, starting from the obvious and
proceeding to the difficult. His chapter Layman's Things42 is
thought-provoking, and those who want to think about the eminent
domain question would be well-advised to test their theories against
the set of examples that Ackerman poses. But cleverness and skill in
the choice of examples are not sufficient to carry the day, and
despite his high level of ambition, Ackerman fails to demolish the
Ordinary Observer, whoever he may be.
In order to understand the source of Ackerman's downfall, it is
40. P. 115.
41. Id. See also pp. 163-67.
42. Pp. 113-67.
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necessary to hone in on the central distinction he draws in this
portion of the book-that between legal and social property. This
distinction is but an extension of Ackerman's earlier observations
about the "ignorant" way in which ordinary people talk about property:
As to social property, Layman will claim to be in a position to point
to existing social practices which any well-socialized person should
recognize as marking a thing out as Layman's thing. If, however,
Layman does not believe himself justified in claiming something as
his without appealing to the opinion of a legal specialist, then I
shall say he
has only legal, but not social, property, in the thing in
43
question.
The importance of this distinction to the eminent domain clause
quickly emerges. "For if the Observing judge's principal objective is
to protect Layman's understanding of his relationship to his things,
this concern will apply with its full force only with regard to social
property." 44 The Ordinary judge, then, defines the contours of
eminent domain law by reference to the sensibilities and judgments
of Ordinary citizens, as revealed in the way they think and speak
about property relationships. All this, Ackerman insists, is at total
variance with the way in which the Scientific Policymaker would
approach this problem. The Ordinary technique makes discriminations between different bundles of property rights and types of
property that are impermissible within Scientific Policymaking. We
can get some sense of what Ackerman does-and what he does
wrong-by looking in detail at the set of examples he uses to develop
his central distinction between legal and social property.
The first of his examples concerns two different types of government control, both of which reduce the value of a $100,000 farm by
$10,000.45 In the one case, the government takes a strip of land
from the edge of the farm for use as a public highway. In the
second, the government flies military planes in the airspace 2 miles
above the farmer's land, causing no sensible inconvenience to
ground users. The economic effects of the two types of conduct,
measured by diminution in value, are the same. Yet the competent
lawyer, much to the bewilderment of the Scientific thinker, will
recognize that $10,000 compensation is required for the road, but
no compensation is required for the direct overflights. Ackerman
insists that the intuitive justification behind these diverse judgments
43. P. 117.
44. Id.
45. Pp. 118-23.
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lies in the fact that only in the highway case does the Ordinary
Layman think it fair to say that the government has taken the
farmer's social, as opposed to legal, property.
The first half of this example-taking for a highway-poses no
particular difficulty because it represents the paradigmatic case of
private land taken for public use, even to those who have never
heard of the distinction between legal and social property. If
theories are needed, they will have to be powerful enough to explain
why, under the clause, compensation should not be awarded for
takings, not why it should be.
The second half of the example-that of the military overflights-is much more difficult. Initially, there is something fishy
about the example, because it never explains how the governmental
use of upper airspace could cost the farmer $10,000 without constituting a nuisance. But that aside, the real problem in the case is
that everyone, whether lawyer or layman, thinks that the farmer has
no claim to the airspace. Ackerman tries to cloak the farmer's claim
with legal respectability by offering us an imaginary dialogue between Layman-the farmowner-and his "fair-minded friend." The
farmer is first asked to explain those "features of social practice
which give social support to your subjective certainties." The dialogue continues as follows:
Layman: Perhaps your doubts will be resolved once you look at
this piece of paper. My lawyer says it entitled me to claim
the airspace. He says: "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum." [Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky.] "How
about that?"
Friend: Well, I think this mumbo-jumbo is something best left to
lawyers. While your lawyer may be perfectly right on the
matter, you have not come up with anything that makes
it plain to me that the airspace is yours. In order to do
that, you must point out an existing pattern of social
practice in which ordinary folk respect your claim to the
thing by refraining from using it without obtaining 46
your
permission except in extraordinary circumstances.
The dialogue rigs the argument by reciting (without translating) the
ad coelum maxim; in fact, both lawyer and layman do regard the
appeal to the ad coelum maxim as "mumbo-jumbo" in this context.
The decided cases as between private owners of land seem to make it
very clear that ownership does not extend up to the heavens, but
only-to use the phrase of that most sensible of lawyers, Frederick
46. P. 120.
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Pollock-up to the level of "possible effective possession." 47 The
farmer may show his deeds to the land, but that will not make a
difference to anyone. The deeds only govern those portions of the
world to which his predecessors in title had possession and thus not
to the very airspace over which the farmer mistakenly claims ownership. What is needed is an account of the ad coelum doctrine,
rather than imaginary bits of dialogue that misstate the current
law.4 8 Nothing in the decided cases points to the asserted tension
between legal and social rights, and much in them suggests that the
maxim, even for lawyers, was a thoughtless, if pardonable, overgeneralization of the early common law. The difference between the
two halves of this example is quite clear. The farmer owns the land,
but he does not own the upper airspace. Without ownership or
possession, the overflights are neither a taking from nor a trespassing against the farmer. Layman got himself a bad lawyer.
To illustrate further his distinction between legal and social
property, Ackerman draws his second example from the law of
future interests:
It is even more dangerous when a second intellectual deficiency
of the Layman comes sharply into focus. For it appears that he is
more willing to grant the privileged status of social property to a
claimant who is capable of exercising dominion over a surface
connected thing at the very moment in time he is claiming the thing as
his. Thus, a person who has only a future interest in a thing-no
matter how ample it will be on fruition-may very easily find
himself in the position of the holder of legal rather than social
rights, capable of evidencing
his claim to a thing only by invoking a
49
specialist opinion.
Although Ackerman intends the example to be insightful, in fact it is
incomprehensible. That lawyers are needed to draft, record and
interpret legal instruments that create or convey future interests is
understood even by laymen to whom the words "future interests"
are a complete mystery. The need to consult a legal specialist,
instead of calling into question the legitimacy of such dealings, only
demonstrates the need for the division of labor in society. I doubt
that any layman, on reflection, would have the slightest doubt that
the taking of a future interest in real property or a trust was covered
47. F. POLLOCK,THE LAW OF TORTS 362 (13th ed. 1929).
48. Here, Ackerman would have done us far better service by tracing the common law
development of the ad coelum doctrine. For an exhaustive discussion of the question, see
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930), modified, 55 F.2d 201 (6th
Cir. 1932).
49. Pp. 122-23.
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by the eminent domain clause. To use the good sense Ackerman
calls Scientific Talk, the owner of the land is entitled to compensation for its full value, based upon both its present and future use;
analogous rules govern beneficial interests under a trust. Why then
should the government's burden be lessened if the owner of the fee
conveys out a remainder and keeps only a life estate? The owner has
made a gift or sale to a third person; he has not made a gift to the
state. Any layman who hears this argument would, I think, accept it
without real question after he troubles himself to learn about fees
and remainders from a trust officer or real estate broker. And the
argument surely will be sufficient to persuade judges and lawyers
who have spent most of their professional careers working with
divided interests in trusts and real estate. The case is so easy, so far
removed from the gray areas of eminent domain litigation, that it is
odd to think Ackerman believes that it illustrates a major theoretical
point.
Ackerman draws his final example from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.5 ' He frames the issue in Mahon as
a problem posed by the decision of a coal company to sell a
homeowner rights to the surface while reserving to itself the right
to mine subsurface minerals at some future time. Whatever else
can be said about this problem, it would seem reasonably clear that,
until the time the coal company began actual mining operations, its
rights in the land were only legal, not social. That is, until mining
commenced, the company could point to no observable pattern of
interaction and restraint that would indicate to a fair-minded Layman that the subjacent coal belonged to the company rather than
to somebody else. It is true that a search of the legal records would
reveal a piece of paper reserving certain rights to the companybut this is sufficient only to establish legal property, not social
property. 5'
It is upon his discussion of Holmes' analysis of Mahon that
Ackerman largely rests his philosophical conclusions of the deep
inadequacy of Ordinary Observing. Yet, about Mahon, Ackerman
makes several very ordinary mistakes. First, he badly misuses the
comparison between the air-rights case and the coal-rights case. He
uses the air-rights case to establish that "legal papers" do not persuade the Layman of social ownership rights, when all the case
establishes is that there are no present property rights, legal or
social, of landowners in the upper airspace. From his wrong conclusion, Ackerman argues that the coal company only has legal rights to
50. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
51. P. 121.
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its unmined coal because it only has a paper title and not active use.
From any sensible conclusion in the air-rights case, however, it
follows that the coal company has full legal and social rights to the
coal, as the Ordinary individual will recognize the force of the deed
by which the coal company, upon payment of valuable consideration, first acquired the land, and the force of the subsequent
deed in which it reserved those mineral rights. In Mahon, the deeds
do govern the ownership of the coal; in the air-rights case, they do
not govern the ownership of the heavens.
Indeed, to accept Ackerman's view of the coal-rights situation
leads to difficulties, if not absurdities, for both lawyer and layman.
Let it be assumed that the coal company does not have the social
right to mine the coal in the future; then by what warrant does it
acquire that social right when it actually begins mining? And by what
warrant could it restrain any individual who first mines the coal
from doing so? Would a system of squatter's or digger's rights
prevail? And how could the coal company keep its coal in place for
future exploitation, a common and sensible practice recognized by
informed laymen? "Paper title" is a derisive phrase only when it is
title to the paper. Deeds, which implement these arrangements, are
important both as legal and social institutions.
Once the distinction between legal and social property is disregarded as mischievous and erroneous, the result in Mahon is easy on
its facts. Ackerman himself sets out the decisive passage from
Holmes' opinion:
If [the city's representatives] have been so short-sighted as to acquire only surface rights without the right of support, we see no
more authority for supplying the latter without compensation than
and refusing
there was for taking the right of way in the first place 52
to pay for it because the public wanted it very much.
How can one disagree? It is the future interest case all over
again. The conveyance of a partial interest for consideration does
not give the state the power to confiscate the rest without consideration, whether it takes adjacent land, a future interest or reserved mineral rights. Holmes does make some general remarks
about the inability to frame a comprehensive test for takings, and
undoubtedly he is correct: There are hard cases, especially when the
state asserts the police power as a justification for a clear loss of
property rights. 53 But Mahon contains not the barest hint of any
52. P. 164 (quoting 260 U.S. at 415).
53.

That this is surely Holmes' position on eminent domain questions is illustrated by his

opinion in Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889). The defendant had chal-

February 1978]

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

police power justification, unless, as Holmes himself points out, the
state is justified in its refusal to pay because the public wants the
support rights very much.
Viewing Mahon in this light, it is incredible what Ackerman, as a
prisoner of his own distinction between legal and social property,
does with Holmes' decision:
Having rejected a position that could possibly be extended "until at
last private property disappears" [the consequence of finding no
taking], Holmes had no option left but to assume that Lawyer's
things should be treated as if they were Layman's things for purposes of takings law. Since the regulation had left a Lawyer's thing
worthless, and Holmes could find no Ordinary justification for
the state's action, compensation was foreordained within the
framework of Ordinary adjudication. Of course, even the most
committed Ordinary judge cannot be affirmatively happy with this
result, since it is Ordinary only in form and not in substance. As a
consequence, it is not surprising to observe Holmes-often so eager to lay down hard and fast objective-looking rules-insisting
that the issue before him turns on "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." Having
vindicated the constitutional status of Lawyer's things, Holmes
senses that he is on uncertain ground and refuses to hand down a
rule of any generality
to govern the taking of legal, as opposed to
54
social, rights.
Were Holmes alive today, I think he would be utterly astonished
to learn of the superstructure imposed upon his opinion in Mahon.
The distinction between legal and social property is vintage Ackerlenged as a taking a spite fence statute that declared any fence "unnecessarily exceeding six
feet in height, maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owners or
occupants of adjoining property" to be a private nuisance. About the statute, Holmes commented, "It may be assumed that under our constitution the legislature would not have power
to prohibit putting up or maintaining stores or houses with malicious intent, and thus to make
a large part of the property of the common wealth dependent upon what a jury might find to
have been the past or to be the present motives of the owner. But it does not follow that the
rule is the same for a boundary fence, unnecessarily built more than six feet high. It may be
said that the difference is one of degree. Most differences are, when nicely analyzed. At any
rate, difference of degree is one of the distinctions by which the right of the legislature to
exercise the police power is determined." Id. at 369, 19 N.E. at 392. In a word, Holmes did not
change his mind one whit in the almost 40 years between the two opinions. Indeed, when
faced with a hard question, Holmes often retreated into this posture. For additional expression of these attitudes, see Holmes' partial concurrence in LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Mil. &
St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1913), a damage action for flax burned by fires started by a railroad,
with the railroad claiming the flax was stored too close to the boundary line, in which he
remarked: "I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depend[s]
upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized. Negligence is all
degree .... " Id. at 354.
54. Pp. 164-65.
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man, not vintage Holmes, and the dilemmas it raises trouble only
the author of the distinction, not the author of the opinion. Intellectual history is hard enough even when we do not rewrite it in our
own image.
In sum, it is perhaps useful to isolate the weakness in Ackerman's
mode of analysis that pervades this part of his book. In talking about
the system of Ordinary analysis, Ackerman's strategy is to emerge
victorious in a battle with a strawman. His account of Ordinary
analysis requires us to assume that judges and laymen both think
that this mode of thought compels the judge to accept as binding the
sentiments of "well-socialized" individuals, even those who, in Ackerman's words, are burdened with the "intellectual limitations of
legal ignoramuses."5 5 Nothing could be further from the truth, for
either laymen or judges. The essence of the Ordinary method is to
direct the attention of the judge or scholar to the expectations,
usages and problems perceived of as central within the general
culture. Thereafter, the success of the method depends in large
measure upon the sophistication of its users. If the original, unexamined sentiments of "ignoramuses" control, we will have an ignorant and uninformed legal system. There is no reason to assume,
however, that regard for Ordinary practices forces judges and
scholars to be passive receptacles of each piece of everyday foolishness. Laymen can be questioned about both the premises and implications of their beliefs. They can be informed about the standard
practices of social institutions, and about their strengths and weaknesses. And they (like first-year law students) can be taught the
fundamentals of stocks, bonds, deeds, and even future interests. In
a word, it is both possible and desirable to distinguish between
unthinking and considered responses. Ackerman's insistence notwithstanding, Ordinary Observing need not be Ignorant Observing.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult in the end to suppress a keen sense of disappointment in Private Property and the Constitution. Ackerman simply has
not delivered the theoretical framework that will enable us to advance the analysis of eminent domain problems. His constant tendency to force individual thinkers, regardless of the nuances of their
positions, into categories of his creation tends to falsify the world
5 . P. 122. The full sentence is: "The idea that the intellectual limitations of legal
ignoramuses should be given legal importance in their own right-independent of any
Comprehensive View-is, however, the last thing that would seem to him reasonable."

February 1978]

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

about which he speaks, culminating in a totally unacceptable account
of the ordinary modes of adjudication. His refusal to deal seriously
with the decided cases makes it impossible to note the extent to
which the current errors could be corrected by better use of traditional techniques instead of the wholesale adoption of new ones. His
constant reliance upon various rhetorical devices---cute turns of
phrase, code words, overcapitalization, and imaginary dialoguesmakes it hard to isolate and analyze his own position.
The most important weakness of the book is illustrated by the
plight of one Sibson, who, we are told at the outset, was prohibited
from developing his marshlands by the New Hampshire Water
Resources Board. At the book's end, we still do not know whether
Ackerman thinks his claim for compensation was rightly denied.
The exclusive emphasis upon abstract methodology and philosophy,
however, must be made to bear fruit, and we need to know how
Ackerman would decide this and other cases under some reasonably
complete version of his own rival theory. He should give us some
sense of which Kantian or Utilitarian theory he prefers, the reasons
he prefers it and the superiority of its results on the troublesome
substantive questions in eminent domain law.
In one sense, the criticisms of Ackerman's work all converge
upon a single point: Private Propertyand the Constitution would have
been a better book if it had adhered more closely to the traditional
modes of legal scholarship. As it is, we have a serious, if selfconscious, intellectual effort with some excellent individual passages
and some fine textual footnotes. Yet we also have a book that fails in
its major mission because it contains too much dubious philosophy
and not enough good law, or, for that matter, good common sense.

